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Abstract
The nature of a physical law is examined, and it is suggested that there
may not be any fundamental dynamical laws. This explains the intrinsic
indeterminism of quantum theory. The probabilities for transition from a
given initial state to a final state then depends on the quantum geometry
that is determined by symmetries, which may exist as relations between
states in the absence of dynamical laws. This enables the experimentally
well confirmed quantum probabilities to be derived from the geometry of
Hilbert space, and gives rise to effective probabilistic laws. An arrow of
time which is consistent with the one given by the second law of ther-
modynamics, regarded as an effective law, is obtained. Symmetries are
used as the basis for a new proposed paradigm of physics. This gives rise
naturally to the gravitational and gauge fields from the symmetry group
of the standard model, and a general procedure for obtaining interactions
from any symmetry group.
Aug. 23, 98. Revised July, 31, 99. quant-ph/9808045.
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1 The Paradigm of Laws
At the end of the millennium we are faced with, what may be the most difficult
intellectual challenge known to humankind, the problem of constructing a quan-
tum theory of gravity that would unify all the interactions. The great difficulty
of this problem is underlined by the fact that it has remained unsolved for more
than seven decades. There is another profoundly difficult problem at the heart
of quantum theory, which has also remained unsolved for the same period of
time, namely the quantum measurement problem. This article will suggest that
the present insolubility of both problems may have the same source, namely
the paradigm of physics that has been used since the creation of physics about
four centuries ago. I shall consider now, briefly, the origin of this paradigm,
and argue that it is based on the metaphysical assumption of the existence of
dynamical laws, which may be discarded.
Prior to the origin of physics, ‘explanations’ of the world were often attempts
to describe the boundary conditions, such as how the world came into being.
But some natural philosophers recognized that much more progress could be
made in ‘understanding’ the world if we gave up trying to explain boundary
conditions and instead described the universal regularities that seem to occur
in contingent phenomena. They tried to predict what would happen if certain
arbitrary initial conditions were specified, instead of explaining these initial
conditions (see, for example, Wigner, 1967, p. 40). The tool for making this
prediction is called a dynamical law of physics. More precisely, a dynamical law
of physics, which I shall call a law for simplicity in this paper, may be defined as
the ability to describe the initial state of a physical system from which the final
state can be predicted, deterministically or probabilistically, using the nature of
the system and its interaction with its environment.
This profound realization led to the origin of physics. The combination of
contingencies, reflected in the boundary conditions or initial conditions, and
universal laws that are independent of contingencies has been the paradigm of
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physics for four centuries. This will be called the paradigm of laws. It is a curious
fact, however, that the laws we use are always associated with symmetries. This
follows from the fact that the experiments allowed by these laws are reproducible
in different places and times, with different orientations etc. (Wigner, 1967, p.
29). Moreover, the symmetries of the laws may be thought of as determining
the physical geometry (Anandan, 1980a). Conversely, we may start with the
geometry and conclude that the laws are constrained by the symmetries of the
geometry.
Now, a law of physics is a strange type of necessity that should be confirmable
or refutable (i.e. testable) in order for it to carry information about the world.
So it cannot be a logical necessity, which is tautological and therefore is not
refutable. Belief in such a metaphysical necessity of laws smacks of the belief in
a supernatural agency that is always regulating natural phenomena.
I shall therefore explore the view that there is no such metaphysical necessity,
which implies that there are no fundamental laws of physics. Pierce (1891),
Wheeler (1980, 1985, 1990, 1994), and Smolin (1997) have suggested that the
laws of physics are mutable. But here I shall question even the very existence of
laws, and propose a new paradigm in which ‘dynamical laws’ will be replaced by
symmetries as the fundamental relational structures in the world. Van Fraassen
(1989) has made an empiricist critique of any kind of structural realism such as
laws or symmetries, but regards symmetries as a better clue to theorizing than
laws. While I also do not regard laws as real, I shall however regard symmetries
as real to be associated with the quantum geometry which gives rise to all
the observed interactions, analogous to how space-time geometry gave rise to
gravitation in classical general relativity.
The non existence of laws imply that there can be neither deterministic laws
(sections 2,3,4) nor fundamental proabilistic laws (section 5). The probability
rule of quantum theory will be deduced, in section 5, from the quantum geom-
etry and the associated symmetries, and therefore will not have the status of a
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fundamental law. This approach naturally gives an arrow of time (section 3). In
section 6, the modular energy-momentum of Aharonov et al (1969) will be used
characterize the four fundamental interactions in terms of the symmetry group
of the standard model. This is then generalized to a new principle which gives
the interactions corresponding to the symmetry group of any physical theory. In
section 7, I shall generalize the celebrated Erlanger program of Klein (1872) for
constructing and defining a geometry as the set of properties that are invariant
under a symmetry group acting on a set of points, by giving up the require-
ment that there should be such a set in quantum theory. The advantages of
the present approach over other interpretations of quantum theory are pointed
out in section 8. The relevance of this approach to the construction of quantum
gravity is discussed in the concluding section 9.
2 Processes and Phenomena
Throughout this article, the term ‘state’ refers to a state in which an individual
system has been observed to be. It is not a state that has been constructed
statistically by measurements on an ensemble of identical systems, as it is in
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. The justification for this
viewpoint and a precise mathematical description of the state, based on possible
observations of an individual system, will be given in section 4.
The absence of deterministic laws implies that there need not be a unique
time evolution for any physical system. This will now be stated as an assump-
tion, called A1.
A1: Physical systems that start from the same initial state need not end up in
the same final state under the same experimental conditions.
Define therefore
a phenomenon to be a sequence of pairs {(α, β1), (α, β2), ...(α, βn), ....} in an
experiment such that α is the common initial state of identical systems and βi
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are their final states under the same experimental conditions. The βis need not
all be distinct. Each pair (α, βi), regarded as an element of a phenomenon, will
be called a trial. Distinct trials will be called processes. In the same experiment
and for the same system, there can be trials with an initial state α′ that is
distinct from α, but these would then belong to a different phenomenon. (This
remark will be relevant to the thought experiment that will be considered in the
next section.)
We know that the observation of quantum phenomena is consistent with
A1, although no attention was paid to quantum physics in my critique of the
metaphysical assumption that there are laws that led to A1. An example is
a Stern-Gerlach experiment with neutrons in which the inhomogenity of the
magnetic field is in the z−direction, and each incoming neutron is observed as
it enters the apparatus to have its spin in the x−direction, which corresponds
to the initial state α. The neutrons then end up in the two possible final states,
β1 and β2, at the two spots on the screen, corresponding to the spin up state
and the spin down states with respect to the z−direction.
By the probability of a process (α, β) is meant the relative frequency of this
pair in a phenomenon as the number of trials tends to infinity under the same
experimental conditions. Since all trials in the phenomenon have the same
initial state, this is the conditional probability of observing the system in β if it
was previously observed in state α. These probabilities are well defined in the
sense that the probability of a process is the same for phenomena that have the
same initial state as the given process under the same experimental conditions.
A symmetry is a transformation on the set of states with the property that
the probabilities of processes are invariant under this transformation. Later I
shall associate symmetries a priori with the quantum geometry which will then
explain why processes have well defined probabilities and why these probabilities
are invariant under symmetries.
The apparent existence of deterministic laws in classical physics is a mystery,
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given A1. But this mystery is removed by the realization that the phenomena
that make up classical physics are limiting cases of quantum phenomena that
correspond to the probability of some processes being much greater than others.
This gives the illusion of deterministic laws in classical physics. E.g. suppose
a baseball or cricket ball is thrown and the positions of its center of mass are
observed to some uncertainty in a series of measurements. These positions are
very likely to be on an approximate parabola. But there is no law compelling
them to lie on a parabola as was mistakenly assumed in classical physics.
3 The Arrow of Time
In general, a phenomenon is not time-reversible. This may be illustrated by an
example due to Penrose (1989, p. 357). He considered photons emitted from a
lamp in a state, denoted here by α1, that is aimed at a detector. Between the
lamp and the detector there is a half-reflecting mirror inclined at an angle, say
450, to the line connecting the lamp to the detector. The probability of trans-
mission or reflection of the photon by the glass is 1
2
for incidence on either side.
Then as the number of photons emitted in state α1 tends to infinity, half of them
are detected in state β1, say, by the detector, while the other half, reflected by
the mirror, strike a wall where they are observed in a state β2, say. So this exper-
iment gives a phenomenon such as P ≡ {(α1, β1), (α1, β2), (α1, β2), (α1, β1), ....}.
This is consistent with A1 above. Now Penrose points out that while the proba-
bility of β1 given α1 is
1
2
, the probability of α1 given β1 is 1. I.e. the probability
of the process (α1, β1) forwards in time is not the same as the probability of this
process backwards in time. More generally, it follows from the above definition
of a phenomenon that the probabilities forwards and backwards in time of any
process in it are not the same unless the phenomeonon is such that all the final
states βi are the same.
The time-reversal of the Penrose phenomenon P above is the sequence
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P ∗ ≡ {(β∗
1
, α∗
1
), (β∗
2
, α∗
1
), (β∗
2
, α∗
1
), (β∗
1
, α∗
1
), ...}, where the * denotes the time-
reversal of the unstarred state (in the present case * changes absorption to
emission and vice versa). The subsequence of P ∗ that consists of pairs with the
same first component β∗1 is P
∗
1 ≡ {(β∗1 , α∗1), (β∗1 , α∗1), (β∗1 , α∗1), ...}. If P ∗1 were a
phenomenon then the probability of the process (β∗
1
, α∗
1
) would be 1. But P ∗
1
cannot take place in the forward time direction if we assume rotational symme-
try of P . To see this, simply rotate the apparatus about the axis perpendicular
to the plane of the apparatus through the middle of the half-reflecting mirror by
1800 so that the positions of the lamp and the detector are interchanged. The
assumption now that P is invariant under this rotation implies that we could
have the phenomenon PR obtained from P by the above mentioned rotation, i.e.
PR = {(β∗1 , α∗1), (β∗1 , α∗2), ....}, with each of the two processes having probability
1/2, where α∗2 is the state of the photon as it is being absorbed, after reflection
by the mirror, in the wall opposite to the wall on which β2 is absorbed. So β
∗
1
does not always end up as α1∗ as required by P ∗1 . Therefore, P ∗1 is not allowed
in the forward time direction, Hence, by observing P , we can determine the
direction of time. Another way of saying this is that if a movie of this experi-
ment is taken, then when the movie is viewed we can say whether the movie is
running forwards or backwards, which therefore gives an arrow of time.
It may be argued that a photon may be emitted, albeit with very low prob-
ability, in the state α2, that is the time reversal of α
∗
2
, from the corresponding
wall, which may then end up as β1 or β2 with equal probability. If this occurs
then P ∗
1
should be modified to include the process (β∗
1
, α∗
2
). But this process
has a very low probability, close to 0, in P ∗
1
, whereas in PR it has probability
1/2. So, rotational symmetry again prevents P ∗
1
being a phenomenon in the
forward time direction. This consideration shows that if all possible initial and
final states are included, the violation of time reversal symmetry is due to the
non invariance of probabilities under time reversal.
Each phenomenon distributes systems in the same or similar original states
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to different states with higher entropy, in general. And the time-reversal of a
phenomenon which would lead to decrease in entropy, in general, cannot occur.
Hence, the above arrow of time is the same as the arrow of time given by
the second law of thermodynamics. Here the second law of thermodynamics is
regarded as an effective law and not a fundamental law. By this I mean that the
second law of thermodynamics is a statistical statement1 about the outcomes
in a large number of experiments, none of which is governed by a law within
the framework of quantum theory. The inherent probabilities in the individual
processes, it will be argued later, in section 5, are the outcomes of the quantum
geometry that is determined by symmetries. So, even this statistical statement
is not a fundamental law.
This appears to resolve at least partially the well known paradox which
arises in the paradigm of laws due to the fact that the microscopic laws have
time-reversal symmetry (ignoring weak interactions which are not relevant to
this problem which arises even in the absence of weak interactions), and yet
there is an observable direction of time. In the present approach, because there
are no laws, this problem does not arise.
The time-irreversibility mentioned above should be distinguished from the
‘irreversible’ amplification which occurs when a measurement is made on the
system, which Penrose (1989) calls the R-process (stands for the ‘reduction of
the state vector’). The latter irreversibility is associated only with the mea-
surement or observation of each of the initial and final states of an individual
system, whereas the former irreversibility is associated with both the initial and
final states in a phenomenon, which is given physical meaning by means of an
ensemble.
1To quote Wheeler (1980), “Ask any molecule what it thinks about the second law of
thermodynamics and it will laugh at the question. All the same the molecules, collectively,
uphold the second law.”
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4 Meaning of States And Processes
The question naturally arises as to what exactly are the initial and final states
that were referred to in the previous two sections. An operational meaning
may be given to states from the fact that it is possible to observe the extended
wave function of a single system by means of protective measurements, which
were introduced by Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman (1993). For example
if the system is in a non degenerate eigenstate of the Hamiltonian, then an
adiabatic measurement on it, which does not lead to entanglement between the
system and the apparatus, would be a protective measurement. This protective
observation therefore shows that an extended wave function is real. But it is not
necessary to assume the Hilbert space structure, including wave functions, in
doing protective measurements. One may begin with the set of physical states,
or simply states, of a physical system as an abstract set without any structure
on it, as in the present approach. Then, as shown by Anandan (1993a), from
the numbers that an experimentalist could in principle obtain from protective
measurements on these states for various observables, the entire Hilbert space
structure may be constructed; the states are then rays in this Hilbert space and
the numbers obtained by the experimentalist are of the form < ψ|A|ψ >, where
|ψ > is a normalized vector in the ray representing the state and A is a Hermitian
operator now representing the observable that was protectively measured. In
the latter approach, due to the absence of the Hilbert space structure at the
beginning, it is not possible to determine the state by calculation prior to the
protective measurements, as one could do if there were a Hilbert space structure
and one knows the protecting Hamiltonian.
Moreover the following purely empirical criterion may be used to ensure
and recognize that a given experiment is a protective measurement and is not
the usual measurement: If we make repeated measurements on a single system
of any pair of arbitrary observables A,B which are alternated indefinitely (i.e.
measure A,B,A,B, ...), then only if the measurements are protective are the
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same values always obtained for A and B (which are < ψ|A|ψ > and < ψ|B|ψ >
respectively). In order for this to be the case for the usual measurements it
would be necessary for A and B to commute. This empirical criterion does not
require any knowledge of the Hamiltonian. Therefore, this criterion and the
observation at the end of the previous paragraph refute the criticism that one
could obtain the wave function by calculation if the Hamiltonian is known and
therefore no new information is obtained by protective measurements. Hence,
protective observations of states have the same epistemological status as the
usual measurements, and have the advantage over the latter of establishing the
ontology of the states.
I shall therefore take the possible initial or final states of the system (i.e.
the αs and βs in the sections 2 and 3) to be any rays in the Hilbert space of
the system. This is because the theorem in the first paragraph of this section
says that the Hilbert space may be constructed from protective measurements
and, conversely, any ray in the Hilbert space may be protectively observed, in
principle. For example, suppose an electron in an atom is in an excited state of
energy, and decays to the ground state. Then both its initial and final states
may, in principle, be protectively observed. So in the present approach there is
no ‘preferred basis’.
By two states being orthogonal I mean that any pair of vectors belonging to
the rays representing these states is orthogonal. The final states that are not the
same (i.e. distinct) are mutually exclusive and are assumed to be orthogonal,
which is contained in the second assumption:
A2. Any two distinct possible final states of a phenomenon are orthogonal.
The essential reason for the time irreversablility of a phenomenon that has
distinct final states, mentioned in section 2, can now be understood in the usual
quantum theory as due to the unitarity of time evolution. This has been called
the U−process by Penrose (1989). This implies that orthogonal states must
necessarily evolve into orthogonal states. Hence it is not possible for identical
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systems beginning from different initial states to evolve always to the same
final state. Therefore, if measurements are made to determine the final state for
systems having two possible initial states we cannot always obtain the same final
state. But if a phenomenon such as P in section 2 is time reversed, then systems
in distinct initial states will always go to the same final state, which violates
unitarity. So, the time-reversal of a phenomenon cannot be realized, except in
the special case when the experimental conditions are such that only one final
state is possible. Unitary evolution preserves information. But when there is
one initial state and more than one final states for an ensemble of systems, as
it is for a phenomenon in general, information is lost. This loss of information
is equivalent to an increase in entropy as mentioned in the previous section.
Within the paradigm of laws there is now the following paradox: Suppose a
particle’s state is protectively observed assigning to it an extended wave function
ψ1, up to an arbitrary phase factor and gauge transformations if the particle
is charged. This direct observation of the wave function implies that it is real.
Suppose now that a usual measurement is made on the system and the system
is found to have a localized wave function ψ2, which is equally real. How do we
account for this sudden transition from ψ1 to ψ2?
One may try to explain this as being due to a dynamical ‘collapse’, i.e. a
transition which is governed by some law (Pearle, 1986; Ghiradi, Rimini and
Weber, 1986; Pearle, 1989; Diosi, 1989; Ghiradi, Grassi and Rimini, 1990; Pen-
rose, 1996). But dynamical collapse models generally have the following three
problems: a) They violate energy-momentum conservation. Even if this hap-
pens so rarely that it is unnoticed, it is unnatural nevertheless from the present
point of view which gives great importance to symmetry principles and the asso-
ciated conserved quantities. b) If the wave function is charged we would expect
it to radiate as it ‘collapses’ from ψ1 to ψ2. c) It has not been possible, as far
as I know, to construct a satisfactory Lorentz covariant model of the ‘collapse’.
But these problems and the above paradox disappear if we give up the notion
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of a law for an individual system.
The above considerations show the problems which arise if we require that
each individual system obeys the U -process. For the individual system what is
observed is the R-process and not the U -process. (In protective measurement
the U -process is observed for the individual system but this is in the trivial case
where the U process does not change the state.) Hence if there is a conflict be-
tween the two processes then we should give up the U -process for the individual
system. The wave function being associated with a single system by protective
measurements and the observed R process that the wave function of this system
undergoes suggest that the transition from the initial to the final wave function
of the individual system is not governed by any law.
On the other hand, for an ensemble of particles which begin with the same
initial state, the U -process can be observed. E.g. in the Stern-Gerlach exper-
iment mentioned in section 2, the superposition of the two wave packets that
are obtained from the U -process can be observed for the entire ensemble of neu-
trons by the two spots they form on the screen. When an individual neutron
undergoes the R-process into one of the spots, it is not necessary to ‘collapse’
the wave function if it represents the entire ensemble. Alternatively, we can
observe the U -process by measuring an Observable, one of whose eigenstates is
the state obtained from the initial state by the U -process. Then all the systems
in the ensemble which had the same initial state will be found in the same final
state that is obtained from the U -process. But again, to verify this we need to
make measurements on an ensemble of a large number of copies of the system.
Hence I shall associate the U -process with an ensemble of systems with the same
initial state and the R-process with the individual system.
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5 Probabilities of Processes
Assumption A1 implies that there are no deterministic laws. This still leaves
open the possibility of there being probabilistic laws. I shall now argue even
against probabilistic laws as fundamental laws. To do so, it is necessary to
derive the experimentally well confirmed probabilities that were postulated in
quantum theory from something more fundamental, which I shall do now. The
answer proposed here to Einstein’s famous question as to why God plays dice
with the universe is that an individual system is forced to obey only logical
necessity and therefore it cannot obey any dynamical law that is not a logical
necessity. There can, nevertheless, be well defined probabilities as a consequence
of symmetries.
Consider, as an example, the tossing of a coin. The equal probabilities
of heads and tails are due to the symmetry between the two sides, and are
independent of the particular law which governs the falling of the coin. This
therefore suggests (but does not prove) that the equal probabilities may exist as
a consequence of the symmetry alone and may be independent of whether there
is a law. A classical coin obeys (apparent) dynamical laws and the indeterminacy
of outcomes is due to our ignorance of the initial conditions while the equal
probabilites are due to the symmetry of the coin and of the possible initial
conditions with respect to the possible final outcomes. But for a quantum
system, due to the absence of law in the present approach, there is an intrinsic
indeterminacy. Nevertheless, there are well defined probabilities which may be
regarded as due to the symmetries of the initial state with respect to the possible
final states, as I shall show now.
Consider first the Stern-Gerlach experiment, mentioned in section 2. The
initial wave function ψ of the neutron is an equal superposition of the two
normalized wave packets ψ↑ and ψ↓ that end up in the two spots with probability
1/2, i.e. ψ = 1√
2
ψ↑+ 1√
2
ψ↓. Consider the two dimensional Hilbert space spanned
by ψ↑ and ψ↓. The set of rays or the projective space of this Hilbert space is a
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sphere with the Fubini-Study metric (Kobayashi and Nomizu, 1969; Anandan
and Aharonov 1990; Anandan, 1991) being the usual metric on this sphere.
Also, ψ↑ and ψ↓ correspond to opposite points of this sphere and ψ is half-way
between them on a geodesic connecting them. This is somewhat analogous to
the symmetry of the coin discussed above. It is reasonable therefore to suppose
that ψ has equal probabilities of going into ψ↑ and ψ↓.
Given an arbitrary quantum system, there is a group of unitary and anti-
unitary transformations which act on its Hilbert space. Physically, this group
may be thought of as relating states that belong to the same physical system
and preserving mutual exclusivity (represented by orthogonality) of the distinct
states among the final states of a phenomenon as required by A2. The proper-
ties that are invariant under this group, which include the Fubini-Study metric
(Anandan and Aharonov, 1990) may therefore be regarded as a geometry in
the sense of Klein’s Erlanger program (Klein, 1872). These properties are of
course also invariant under the universal symmetry group of the fundamental
interactions which is a subgroup of this meta- symmetry group of unitary and
anti-unitary transformations.
Define the distance between two states to be the Fubini-Study length of the
shortest geodesic joining them. The distance s between two states that are
represented by normalized state vectors |ψ > and |ψ′ > is then given by
cos
s
2
= | < ψ|ψ′ > |, (1)
where sǫ[0, π]. Here I have scaled the Fubini-Study metric so that the sphere
that is the projective space of the Hilbert subspace spanned by ψ and ψ′ has
unit radius. Then the distance between two orthogonal states (opposite points
on the sphere) is π. In the following only the definition of distance given by (1)
is used, and no other knowledge of the Fubini-Study metric is needed.
The present work, to use the usual formalism of quantum theory, corresponds
to the Heisenberg picture in which the U -process governs the observables, while
the state is changed only during an R-process. Since these time dependent
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observables are common to all systems which have the given Hamiltonian, this
is consistent with the conclusion above that the U - process should be associated
with an ensemble of systems while the R-process may be associated with the
individual system. I now generalize the equiprobabilities in the above Stern-
Gerlach experiment to the following assumption:
A3. Suppose a system is in an initial state α, which has equal distances to
possible final states β1 and β2. Then the probabilities of transition from α to β1
and β2 are equal.
In the Heisenberg picture the initial and final states are on the same footing
because they are all time independent. Also, in A2, the mutual exclusivity of the
final states of a phenomenon was expressed by their orthogonality. This suggests
that a state that is orthogonal to the initial state cannot be a possible final state.
Similarly, we would expect that a state that is orthogonal to all possible final
states must be orthogonal to the initial state. The last two statements are
equivalent to the following assumption:
A4. The state vector representing the initial state in a phenomenon can be
expressed as a linear combination of the state vectors that represent all possible
final states with non zero coefficients.
Probabilities of transition between an arbitrary pair of states will now be
obtained using the ‘classical’ or ‘standard’ definition of probability (Gnedenko,
1967; Zurek, 1998). The basic idea here is to derive an arbitrary probability
by expressing it in terms of equiprobabilities of equally likely events, which is a
primitive concept. In the present case, transitions to states that are equidistant
from the initial state have equal probabilities by A3. Consider a phenomenon
in which the initial state is represented by |ψ > and all possible distinct final
states by |ψi >, i = 1, 2, ...N . Then from A2 and A4, we can write
|ψ >=
N∑
i=1
ci|ψi > (2)
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where without loss of generality ci are real and positive, and
< ψi|ψj >= δij , < ψ|ψ >= 1. (3)
First consider the special case
|ψ >=
N∑
i=1
cos
θ
2
|ψi > . (4)
Then (3) implies
N cos2
θ
2
= 1. (5)
It also follows from (1) that the state represented by |ψ > has equal distance θ
from all the states represented by |ψi >. Replacing |ψi > by eiφi |ψi > in (4) or
(2) does not change the distances between states. This is why A3 was stated in
terms of distances in the state space. It follows from A3 that the probabilities
of transition from ψ to all ψi are the same. Since these probabilities must add
up to 1, the probability of transition from ψ to each ψi is
1
N
. But from (5) and
(4)
1
N
= cos2
θ
2
= | < ψ|ψi > |2 (6)
which is therefore the probability of transition from ψ to ψi.
Consider now the more general case of (2) in which the cis need not be
equal. Introduce now an auxiliary system whose possible states belong to an
infinite dimensional Hilbert space. The state vector of the combined system is
the direct product |ψ > |φ > , where the state |φ > of the auxiliary system does
not interact with |ψ > and both state vectors are normalized. The purpose
of introducing the auxiliary system is to use the assumption A3 on |ψ > |φ >
in order to derive the the probabilities of transition from ψ to all ψi. For each
positive integer ni, there exist orthonormal state vectors {|φij >, j = 1, 2, ..., ni}
such that
|φ >=
ni∑
j=1
1√
ni
|φij > (7)
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Using (7), the state vector of the combined system may be written as
|ψ > |φ >=
N∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
ci√
ni
|ψi > |φij > . (8)
Choose the positive integers ni so that for all i, j,
ci√
ni
≈ cj√
nj
. (9)
If the ratios c2i /c
2
k are rational for all i and a fixed k, and N is finite, then there
exist positive integers nis such that c
2
i = ni/M , where M is a common real
denominator. Then (9) is an exact equality. If at least one of these ratios is
irrational then, owing to the rational numbers being dense in the real line, the
positive integers ni may be made large enough to make (9) as close as possible
to equalities.
Then (8) reduces to the special case considered before in which the coef-
ficients are equal. Therefore, the probability of transition to |ψi > |φij >
is
c2i
ni
(j = 1, 2, ...ni), using (6). Since there are ni such mutually exclu-
sive states for a given i, the probability of transition to the state |ψi > is
ni × c
2
i
ni
= c2i = | < ψ|ψi > |2, using (2) and (3). So the quantum probability
rule has been derived from the assumptions A1 to A4. A somewhat similar
argument has been given by Zurek (1998) using density matrices in the context
of decoherence.
It follows that the probability of transition between Heisenberg states |α >
and |β > is | < α|β > |2 irrespective of the time elapsed between the observations
of |α > and |β >. Hence, the converse of A3, above, is also valid.
6 Symmetries and Interactions
If there are no laws then how do we explain the regularities we observe in the
world? I shall argue here that the answer lies in symmetries. To make this
argument, I shall first use the presently used laws of physics in order to obtain
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a characterization of all fundamental interactions in terms of symmetries. This
statement will be so elegant and simple that it will suggest that we may discard
the laws and keep the symmetries.
First consider the realization of quantum probabilities obtained in Section 5
in a simple experiment, namely diffraction through a narrow slit. In this phe-
nomenon, particles that were initially prepared in the same state, after they go
through the slit, end up at various points on a screen. It is well known that,
the density of distribution of particles on the screen (the diffraction pattern),
which gives the probability density for the possible final states in the limit of
large number of particles, has an oscillatory behavior: It has a central maxi-
mum where the particles are most likely to strike, and the probability density
decreases, as would be expected, as we move away from this point. But then
after reaching a minimum, strangely enough, the probability density increases,
then decreases again to a minimum and increases again, and so on. This is very
different from what would be expected classically, namely a monotonic decrease
in probability density as we move away from the central point.
I believe that nature is telling us something very important about quantum
geometry even in this simple experiment. It is that given two points A and B
separated by a distance ℓ, the translation operator
exp(ipℓ), (10)
where p is the momentum (generator of translations) in the direction from A
to B, is more fundamental than the distance ℓ between A and B, because the
eigenvalues of (10) oscillate with ℓ. It is (10) which relates appropriate pairs
of quantum states (represented by vectors in Hilbert space), whereas ℓ may be
regarded as a derived concept. Indeed, ℓ regarded as the distance between A
and B is an approximate concept because there is inevitably a fuzziness in the
determination of points owing to the uncertainty principle, as shown for example
by Wigner (1967, p. 62-69). But (10), regarded as a translation of any quantum
state, has no such fuzziness.
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Now (10) is equivalent to the ‘modular momentum’ introduced by Aharonov
et al (1969) as a more fundamental variable than the momentum p. They
showed that this variable captures an essential non local aspect of quantum
theory, which makes quantum physics fundamentally different from classical
physics. To see this consider the wave packet
ψα(x, y, z) =
1√
2
f(x, y, z) +
1√
2
exp(iα)f(x − ℓ, y, z) (11)
where f(x, y, z) is a normalized wave function such that f(x, y, z) and f(x −
ℓ, y, z) are non overlapping functions. For example, ψα may be the superposition
of two wave packets in a double slit interference experiment at the time when
they are emerging from the two slits that are separated by a distance ℓ in the
x−direction. Then
< ψα| exp(ipℓ)|ψα >= 1
2
exp(iα). (12)
So the expectation value of (10) gives the phase difference between the two
superposed wave packets. What makes this non local is that no experiment per-
formed on the wave packets at the given time could detect this phase difference
between the non overlapping wave packets. But α may be observed when they
interfere subsequently. This is unlike in classical physics where all experiments
performed locally on the two wave packets can predict what will happen sub-
sequently. In classical physics also the translational operator generated by the
momentum may be defined on the phase space, which is the classical analog
of the Hilbert space, but it contains no more information than the momentum.
But in quantum physics, (10) contains more information than p, which is non
local and observable.
The result (12) may be applied to the momentum distribution in the
Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect on the electron beams interfering around a solenoid
due to the magnetic field confined inside the solenoid. Aharonov et al (1969)
showed that although there is no exchange of momentum between each electron
and the solenoid in the AB effect, for the obvious reason that there is no force on
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the electron due to the magnetic field, there is nevertheless a non local exchange
of modular momentum between them. The magnetic field causes a shift in the
interference fringes due to the exchange of exp(ipℓ). But the envelope of the
interference pattern does not shift because there is no exchange of any of the
moments of momentum pn (n is any positive integer). Hence, (10) is a more
fundamental observable than p. Combining this with the earlier considerations
in this section, I conclude that the group element exp(ipℓ) is more fundamental
than either p or ℓ.
In the presence of the electromagnetic field, exp(ipℓ) is gauge dependent.
The gauge invariant re-statement of the above is that in the AB effect the mod-
ular kinetic momentum exp i(pℓ − e ∫ ℓ
0
Adx) is exchanged but not the kinetic
momentum p− eA. The last two operators are gauge invariant. Aharonov et al
(1969) also showed that when there is a forceless interaction, there could be an
exchange of modular energy in the absence of an exchange of energy. Also, the
above considerations on the AB effect will also apply to the generalization of the
AB effect to arbitrary gauge fields (see Wisnivesky and Aharonov (1967), Anan-
dan(1970)). I therefore generalize the modular kinetic momentum covariantly,
in an arbitrary gauge field, to the modular kinetic energy- momentum
fγ = P exp{i
∫ ℓµ
0
(pν −AkνTk)dxν} (13)
where Tk generate the gauge group, A
k
ν is the gauge potential and P denotes
path ordering.
To generalize this further to include the gravitational field, I shall use the
principle of equivalence according to which at each space- time point there
exists a local Minkowski coordinate system (xa, a = 0, 1, 2, 3). The kinetic
energy-momentum operator in this coordinate system is
Πa ≡ pa −AkaTk.
This may be written in an arbitrary coordinate system as
θaµΠa ≡ θaµpa −AkµTk,
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where θaµ is the canonical 1-form (Kobayashi and Nomizu (1963) or the solder
form (Trautman, 1973, Anandan ,1993b), so called because it solders the 1-
forms in the local inertial frame to the cotangent space of space-time at each
point. The generalization of (13) in the presence of gravity and gauges fields is
then
gγ = Pexp(−i
∫
γ
Γµdx
µ), (14)
where
Γµ = θµ
aPa +
1
2
ωµ
a
b
M ba −AkµTk. (15)
Here, Pa generate space-time translations, M
b
a generate Lorentz transforma-
tions and Tk generate the gauge group G. The θ, ω and A are defined along
the curve γ. (θ and ω should not be thought of as functions of space in the
definiton of gγ because this would make gγ non unitary.) Hence, gγ ǫ Poincare
group × G.
γ may be any open or closed curve. When γ is an infinitesimal closed curve
spanning an area element dσµν , using (14) and the Lie algebra relations of the
Poincare group and the gauge group, we obtain (Anandan, 1980, 1996)
gγ = 1 + i(Qµν
aPa +
1
2
Rµν
a
b
M ba + Fµν
kTk)
dσµν
2
(16)
where the 2−forms
Qa = dθa + ωab ∧ θb, Rab = dωab + ωac ∧ ωcb, F = dAk + CkmnAm ∧An (17)
are called the torsion, linear curvature, and the Yang-Mills field strength, respec-
tively, and Ckmn are the structure constants of the gauge Lie algebra. Whenever
two quantum systems interact via gravity and gauge fields, it can be shown that
there exist curves γ so that gγ is exchanged between the two systems.
This result was obtained from laws which had the above symmetries, at
least locally. But since gγ is what is observed
2 , it may be possible to keep
2In practice, we observe Hermitian operators such as gγ+gγ† and i(gγ−gγ†) from which of
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it and discard the laws. Then symmetries need not be regarded as originating
as invariances of laws but instead regarded as relations between states. These
relations, and hence the symmetries, are universal in that they have represen-
tations in every Hilbert space. (The gauge group part of the symmetries would
be trivial in representations in which the gauge charges are zero.) They may
therefore be regarded as defining the geometry of quantum theory.
The above considerations suggest the following principle which character-
izes all interactions: Two quantum systems interact if and only if there is an
exchange of a symmetry group element between them. In terms of the usual
quantum theory, this means that the expectation value of the symmetry group
element for each of the states of the quantum system changes, but not for the
state of the combined system. If the symmetry group S is chosen to be that of
the standard model, i.e. S = P ×G, where P is the Fermionic covering group of
the Poincare group (semi-direct product of SL(2, C) with the space-time trans-
lational group) and G = U(1) × SU(2) × SU(3), then I conjecture that in an
appropriate limit the usual gravity and gauge fields are obtained. The appro-
priate limit means that the systems which produce the gravity and gauge fields
may be treated classically. In this limit the group element which is exchanged
may be written in the form (14) so that classical gravity and gauge fields may
be obtained from (15). But we may need to change S when the standard model
is superseded by a deeper theory. The above principle would then still hold
and give us a new set of fields corresponding to the new symmetry group. I
shall therefore call these fields, corresponding to arbitrary symmetry groups,
symmetry fields.
In the above treatment, gravitational and gauge fields were treated classi-
cally. When the fields are quantized, the probability amplitude for a process is
at present obtained by adding integrals represented by Feynman diagrams. At
course gγ may be determined. See Anandan (1986a,b) for a discussion of how these Hermitian
operators may be observed in interference experiments.
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each vertex of a Feynman diagram the energy-momentum is exchanged. But
it may be useful to reformulate quantum field theory in terms of exchange of
modular energy-momentum. At distance scales of the order of Planck length,
space-time geometry breaks down, and the usual Feynman diagrams may not
be meaningful. Also, in (14), γ cannot then be meaningfully defined. However,
we may then be able to replace (14) by an element of the symmetry group that
does not require a space-time curve γ for its definition. Such a theory would be
a quantum theory of gravity. Since quantum gravity is expected to unify all the
interactions, the unified treatment of all the fundamental interactions in (14)
suggests that it may be useful in constructing quantum gravity.
An advantage of the present approach is that non local interactions, such
as the non local exchange of modular momentum between the solenoid and the
charge in the AB effect and its generalization to gauge fields and gravitation, is
easily treated. But in the AB effect for example, the change in the moduluar
momentum undergone by the charged wave function gives the AB phase shift
around a closed curve because of the U -process undergone by the interfering
beams. Also, the U -process due to Schro¨dinger evolution undergone by the state
vector in the Schro¨dinger picture or the observables in the Heisenberg picture
was associated earlier with ensembles of identical quantum systems because this
determines the probabilities of processes of individual systems. The Hamiltonian
that generates the U process comes from a Lagrangian. It may appear that the
specification of the Lagrangian constitutes a law. But in fact, the general form
of the Lagrangian for a system of non relativistic interacting particles may be
obtained from Galilean symmetries (Landau and Lifshitz, 1976; Lawrie, 1994).
In relativistic quantum field theory, the fields in the Lagrangian must provide
representations of the symmetry group and the Lagrangian is invariant under
this group. This is a major constraint on the fields and the Lagrangian.
But even after the fields are specified, there are still an infinite number
of Lagrangians that are invariant under the symmetry group. However, the
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requirement of renormalizability places a severe restriction on the possible La-
grangians. In the case of the symmetry group S of the standard model, after
specifying the fields and the coupling constants (which are the contingencies
of this model), the requirement of renormalizability pretty much uniquely de-
termines the Lagrangian of all the fields, excluding gravity, as mentioned by
Weinberg (1980). A quantum theoretic description of the gravitational field
cannot be obtained this way at present, which I believe to be due to an insuf-
ficient understanding at present of the connection between symmetries and the
gravitational field. One of the purposes of the present article is to elucidate
this connection, which hopefully would help in constructing a quantum theory
of gravity. In a future theory, renormalizability may be realized as being due to
logical self-consistency of the theory.
I therefore make the following conjecture: Regularities in physical phenom-
ena are due to symmetries, logical or mathematical consistency, and contingen-
cies. The contingencies here include algortithmically undecidable propositions
which exist, according to Go¨del’s theorem, in any axiomatic system that is at
least as rich as the natural numbers. In view of Go¨del’s theorem, it may not be
possible to construct a physical theory that is due entirely to logical or math-
ematical necessity. Also, at present it seems possible for the world to have, in
principle, symmetries that are different from the ones we observe, or have no
symmetries at all, without violating logical or mathematical necessity. So, if
we choose a particular symmetry group, in the new paradigm of symmetries
proposed here, it would restrict the physical theory to a particular, but it seems
contingent, class of mathematical models.
7 Quantum Geometry
There are parallels in physical geometry to the two views of having dynami-
cal laws, or not having dynamical laws but having symmetries. In the former
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case, it is natural to adopt the Riemannian geometry of space-time because the
dynamical laws give evolutions which are best described in space-time. E.g.
geodesics are world-lines of free particles in classical general relativity. But it
was pointed out that a different conception of geometry is better suited for
quantum theory (Anandan, 1980a). This is based on Klein’s Erlanger program,
according to which a geometry is a set of properties invariant under a group
of transformations acting on a set of points. It is difficult to take this set to
be space-time, because space-time points are not observable owing to the un-
certainty principle in quantum theory, as already mentioned. Also, it does not
seem plausible to talk of an electron as being immersed in space-time, because
its states belong to a Hilbert space, which has a very different geometry and
interpretation.
It therefore seems reasonable to generalize Klein’s Erlanger program so that
the symmetry group does not act on a universal set of points. Instead, I shall
let the same symmetry group S to simply act on each Hilbert space, which is
the set of possible states of a system. Each gǫS is universal in the sense that
the relation it determines between states α and β ≡ gα is independent of α,
including which Hilbert space α belongs to. Also the relation defined by the
condition that a pair of states are related by arbitrary gǫS is an equivalence
relation. The last two properties justify associating a geometry directly with
S. The available evidence at present is consistent with S ≡ Poincare group
× G, where G = U(1) × SU(2) × SU(3). This universal symmetry group S,
as shown in the previous section, gives rise to all the fundamental interactions.
Replacing dynamical laws by symmetries as the fundamental concept in physics
corresponds to changing the physical geometry to the above concept of geometry
in which symmetries directly relate equivalent states without being required to
act on a universal set of points, such as the Riemannian space-time.
The Riemannian space-time enabled the natural inclusion of the classical
gravitational field as the metrical relations between space-time points. Similarly,
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the generalized Klein geometry described above enables the natural inclusion
of all fundamental interactions as symmetry relations between quantum states.
This is provided by (14) in an approximate manner because γ is a space-time
curve, which has no operational meaning in quantum physics. A more precise
treatment may give the quantized fields instead of the classical fields contained
in (14).
The acceptance of the primary role of symmetries in physics would remove
the mystery of why there are complex numbers in quantum mechanics. This
is because the representations of groups act more naturally on complex vector
spaces than on real vector spaces. For example, the U(1) group has a real
faithful representation SO(2,R), where R is the real line. But the matrices of
this representation and its Lie algebra do not have eigenvalues or eigenvectors,
if we restrict to the field of real numbers. The elements of SO(2,R) may be
written in the form exp(φX), where φǫR and X2 = −I. Hence, X defines a
complex structure on the vector space R2 on which SO(2,R) acts. Since X
commutes with SO(2,R), this complex structure is invariant under SO(2,R).
It is then natural to treat this vector space as a one-dimensional complex vector
space C, with X replaced by i and SO(2,R) correspondingly replaced by U(1).
The different representations of the U(1) group then correspond physically to
different charges. The compactness of the U(1) group then implies that charges
are integer multiples of a fundamental charge (see for example Yang, 1969),
which is consistent with observation.
In the case of the Lorentz group, the existence of Fermions implies that
it should be SL(2, C) and not its (2 − 1) isomorphic group SO(3, 1,R). The
fundamental representation of SL(2, C) acts on C2, which is the space of spinors.
Here also we may regard this action as the action of a real linear group on R4,
which however contains a complex structure Y (Y 2 = −I) that commutes with
this group. So, it is natural to regard this R4 as C2. The action of Y on
this C2 is simply iI, where I is the identity transformation. But a vector in
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any tangent space V of space-time is a quadratic combination of the spinors
and their complex conjugates (or the vectors in the above R4) at that point.
Therefore, the action of Y corresponds to the identity operation on V . This
explains why the complex structure Y was ‘hidden’ prior to the discovery of
Fermions. It also explains why general relativity, which was formulated in terms
of tensors that take their values in the tensor products of V with itself and its
dual, does not need complex numbers. But it should be noted that even prior to
the discovery of Fermions, complex numbers were used in quantum mechanics
because of unitary representations of symmetry groups. As remarked above,
these representations are more natural than real representations because of the
existence of eigenvalues and eigenvectors over the field C.
The view that there is no law corresponds to our experience of a ‘flow of
time’, which is a mystery in the paradigm of laws. As mentioned above, in
the latter paradigm space-time geometry is the appropriate geometry. But if
everything is laid out on space-time, there does not seem to be any room for
time to ‘flow’. Moreover, the time of our consciousness has an arrow due to our
remembering our past, which is unique, but we do not know of our uncertain
future. But this is the same as the arrow of time determined by pheonomena,
obtained in section 3, because the final states of a phenomenon, as expressed by
A1 above, is uncertain in general. So, the present approach has the advantage
that it is in accordance with our conscious experience of time, which may be
the most immediate experience we have, and which therefore science should take
into account.
8 Comparison With Other Approaches To
Quantum Theory
The present approach will now be compared with some other interpretations of
quantum theory. Two consistent interpretations of quantum theory within the
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paradigm of laws are the Bohm (1952) (see also Holland, 1993), and the Everett
(1957) interpretations. Both of them take Schrodinger’s equation seriously as
the deterministic law governing quantum evolution. The Bohm interpretation
avoids the ‘many worlds’ of Everett by postulating a dual ontology that requires
the existence of particles as well as the wave. This also has the advantage that
it is possible to introduce probabilities which are consistent with experiment
by associating them with the particles while the wave undergoes deterministic
evolution. Whereas in the Everett interpretation, since there is only a wave that
undergoes deterministic evolution, it is not possible to explain the probabilities
observed in quantum experiments by simply postulating a measure on the rel-
ative states (Everett, 1957). In the Bohm interpretation, on the other hand, it
is not clear why the wave function which deterministically guides the particle
should also give the probability density for finding it.
The present approach does not require a dual ontology as in the Bohm inter-
pretation. It resembles most the Copenhagen interpretation, but differs from it
in not making an arbitrary division between the classical and quantum worlds.
By including protective measurements, which were unknown to the founders of
the Copenhagen interpretation, the present approach enables an extended wave
function to be treated as real, instead of treating only the localized ‘events’ as-
sociated with the ‘classical’ measuring apparatus as real as in the Copenhagen
interpretation. The indeterminacy of quantum theory was introduced here by
the denial of deterministic evolutionary laws governing the state, and not by
denying the reality of the wave function and treating it as containing a catalog
of probabilities as done by the Copenhagen interpretation. The present inter-
pretation shares, however, with the Copenhagen and other interpretations the
mystery of what a measurement really is.
There are two advantages to the present approach over the other interpreta-
tions of quantum theory: 1) The indeterminacy of quantum mechanics is built
in right from the beginning by denying the existence of deterministic laws. In
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the other interpretations, which work within the paradigm of laws, it is not clear
why the dynamical laws which are believed to exist are not deterministic; this
intrinsic indeterminacy is a mystery and needs to be postulated in an arbitrary
manner3.
2) If there are also no probabilistic laws but only symmetries at a funda-
mental level, then the probabilities are constrained only by the symmetries.
Hence, the probabilities must depend on the invariants under these symmetries
which include the geometry of the Hilbert space. So it is not surprising that in
the derivation of probabilities, in section 5, the geometry of the Hilbert space
played a role. This throws light on another long standing mystery of quantum
mechanics, namely why the probabilities come from the geometry of the Hilbert
space4, unlike in general relativity where geometry plays no stochastic role.
9 Further Discussion and Conclusion
In the foregoing considerations, the paradigm of laws was rejected because it
is based on the metaphysical assumption that physical systems should in some
mysterious way be ‘railroaded’ into obeying dynamical laws. Such a ‘railroad’
cannot be observed. For example, the evolution of the state of an electron
between successive observations, say at the source and the detector, cannot be
operationally defined. In the Bohm interpretation, considered in the previous
section, the electron may be assigned a trajectory between the source and the
3The Copenhagen interpretation tries to rationalize this indeterminacy within the pardigm
of laws by saying that the observation of a microscopic system disturbs it, as in the well known
Heisenberg microscope experiment. The use of the wave function to describe the state of the
microscopic system is then argued as being necessary in order to represent this indeterminacy.
But this argument cannot be made in the case of protective measurements of the quantum
system which do not disturb the state of the system represented by its wave function, which
is directly observed.
4 For a different geometric approach to the stochasticity of quantum mechanics see Hugh-
ston (1996).
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detector, but this trajectory is not observable. To describe the evolution of the
wave function of the electron as it interacts with other macroscopic systems
requires the introduction of the ‘many worlds’ of Everett, which are also not
observable. On the other hand, the generators of the symmetry group are
conserved quantities, such as charge or total momentum, which are observable.
The existence of these conserved quantities is also shown from the fact that they
generate gauge fields and gravity which have observable effects.
The history of physics has shown the usefulness of rejecting metaphysical
assumptions, e.g. Einstein’s rejection of absolute simultaneity in developing
special relativity and the notion of a global inertial frame in developing general
relativity. The rejection of the metaphysical assumption of laws led immediately
to the intrinsic indeterminacy of quantum theory, in section 2, which in turn
gave an arrow of time, in section 3. In section 5, the observed probabilities of
quantum theory were also obtained in a natural manner. The postulate that
symmetries should play the fundamental role in the new proposed paradigm
naturally gave, in section 6, the observed gravitational and gauge fields for the
symmetries of the standard model.
The last result may also be used to argue for the reality of symmetries. (14),
in section 6, may be regarded as an alteration of the symmetries experienced by
a quantum state due to gravity and gauge fields. This changes the probabilities
of processes undergone by the quantum system that experiences these fields.
The quantum system may then be expected to react back to modify the fields
contained in (14). We know this to be the case experimentally: all systems
modify the gravitational fields, charged systems modify the electromagnetic
field etc. So, if the system is affected by the fields, which depends on the
particular representation of the symmetry group to which it belongs to, then it
reacts back on the fields. A criterion for reality has been proposed by Anandan
and Brown(1995) according to which an object may be regarded as real if it
satisfies the action-reaction principle. According to this criterion, the symmetry
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group element (14), which replaces the usual gravitational and gauge fields, may
be regarded as real. I believe that it is these symmetry group elements (14),
instead of the usual fields, which should be used to construct a quantum theory
of gravity.
We may draw encouragement for the last remark from the following historical
fact. As pointed out by Yang (1987), the importance of the electromagnetic
phase factor,
exp(− ie
h¯
∫
γ
Aµdx
µ), (18)
was recognized by Schro¨dinger (1922), in his study of Weyl’s gauge theory, four
years before he introduced the wave function. I wish to emphasize that (18) is
an element of the U(1) symmetry group, and is part of (14), which belongs to
the entire symmetry group. From the present point of view, (18) is not only
historically but also logically prior to the Schro¨dinger equation introduced in
1926. Similarly, (14) may be a precursor to a fully developed quantum theory
of gravity which is yet to come.
If the last conjecture is realized then there may still be the ultimate question
of why (14) belongs to a particular symmetry group S and not some other
symmetry group. The U(1), SU(2) and SU(3) symmetries, which are contained
in S according to the standard model, are the simplest unitary symmetries and
may be justified on the grounds of simplicity. But why should S contain the
Poincare group of symmetries instead of some other symmetries? The anthropic
principle may provide the answer to this question5. According to this principle,
as interpreted here, there are parallel universes in which there could be different
symmetries, and hence different effective laws that are obtained from these
symmetries, logical self-consistency, and contingencies. The universe in which
we live must be one in which the symmetries are such that they allow life to
evolve. This places a restriction on the symmetries in our universe. However,
we should also be open to the possibility that quantum gravity may modify S
5I thank Dennis Sciama for a discussion concerning this point.
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to some other symmetry group.
The purpose of physics is to simplify our understanding of nature. Sim-
plification is often accompanied by immense progress, not only in physics but
also in all of science. Giving up trying to explain the initial conditions in favor
of laws as our basis for understanding nature, mentioned at the beginning of
this article, led to an enormous simplification. This also resulted in tremendous
progress in physics. Similarly, foregoing laws and accepting symmetries as our
basis for understanding nature would lead to another enormous simplification,
and perhaps also much more progress. This is particularly relevant to the con-
struction of quantum gravity. Instead of trying to discover new laws, we should
perhaps focus on understanding how symmetries give rise to all the fundamen-
tal interactions in nature, including gravity. The quantum mechanical nature
of these interactions, as discussed above, is then a natural consequence of the
denial of the existence of fundamental laws, the central role of symmetries, and
the nature of the states of the systems that undergo these interactions.
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